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Darfur News Briefs« June 30, 2006 July 7, 2006 Despite hopes that collective pressure at the AU summit would convince President alBeshir to accept a UN peacekeeping mission, the weekend ended without any such agreement. Although news stories issued immediately after the summit reported that the AU had agreed to stay until January, the head of AMIS later clarified that the AU was still planning to leave in October unless Khartoum consented to a UN force. Meanwhile, violence on the ground continues to increase and the UN special envoy has warned that the Darfur Peace Agreement is in danger of collapsing. The Situation on the Ground UN special envoy Jan Pronk warned that violence has been increasing in the wake of the DPA and that violations of the agreement have been ignored. At least 12 people were killed in attacks in a neighboring region of Darfur. The National Redemption Front, the alliance formed by rebel groups who have refused to sign the peace deal, declared the 27 monthold truce to be dead attempted to seize a town in North Kordofan. The rebels claimed that the raid was a response to earlier attacks by the Sudanese army in Darfur, but many worry that the conflict may now begin to spread to other regions of Sudan. Insecurity in Kalma, Darfur’s largest IDP camp, is increasing, apparently fueled by dissatisfaction with the DPA. Attacks on civilians and aid workers are common, although it is unclear whether or not the perpetrators are coming from within the camps. Violence occurs mostly at nighttime, when the African Union cannot afford to station patrols. IDPs in South Darfur accused Minnawi’s faction of the SLA of attacking two camps and killing nine people. In another region of Darfur, SLA soldiers were blamed for the abduction of a sheikh and two of his sisters. Due to deteriorating relations between Sudan and Chad, Sudan has ordered that all Chadians in the AU force in Darfur leave the region. The Proposed UN Transfer There are no signs that Khartoum will allow a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. At the AU summit this weekend, the UN secretarygeneral failed to convince President alBeshir to accept such a force. Annan said that the two had had a “constructive conversation” and that he believes that a UN transfer is still possible. “We are dealing with a leader who might have genuine difficulties and genuine reasons for the position he is taking and it is my responsibility to explain to him why he will need the assistance of the UN,” Annan said following a meeting with alBeshir. News stories issued after the summit reported that the African Union had agreed to extend their mission until the end of the year. However, in a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, the head of AMIS said that this had been a misunderstanding and that the AU would leave at the end of September unless Khartoum consented to a UN force. In an interview with the antigenocide group Aegis Trust, the AU official confirmed, “if the government … gives its consent for a UN deployment, we will be willing to hold the fort until such time as the UN is ready and able to come in.” Kofi Annan pledged to raise funds for AMIS at a donors’ conference in July. Tanzania announced that it would be willing to contribute troops for a peacekeeping mission to Darfur if given certain assurances. “If the warring factions are still fighting, then the prospects for peace are slim and for that matter, I have no reason to send my boys to Darfur,” said Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete. He also said that he would need guarantees that his troops would receive payment and the necessary military equipment. The Peace Process After acknowledging on his weblog last week that the DPA was in danger of collapse, UN envoy Jan Pronk urged again this week that the peace deal be amended to include measures such as international security guarantees and greater compensation for war victims. However, the Sudanese government has refused to consider any such additions, claiming that the original agreement cannot be altered. Sudanese foreign minister Lam Akol insisted, “We will never accept an amendment because Pronk says … we will amend the peace deal when the reality on the ground dictates [and] it does not.” Despite the fact that nearly all of the deadlines have been missed, the Sudanese government has reaffirmed its support of the DPA, and the Sudanese parliament officially ratified the agreement this week. Following the rebel attacks in Kordofan, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs denounced the rebel groups for committing “an act of sabotage on the DPA” and called for UN and AU sanctions on the perpetrators. Jan Pronk also condemned the attacks, describing them as “a serious event which we hope will not have adverse effects on the Darfur peace process.” In a meeting with the Egyptian foreign minister, Minni Minawi asked for Egypt’s support in securing stability and rebuilding Darfur. The Egyptian minister responded by calling for all rebel groups to sign the DPA and pledging Egypt’s assistance in the reconstruction efforts. International Action The Rwandan Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs recently outlined issues to discuss with the ministers of defense and security. One of the main concerns raised in the report was how to ensure the safety of Rwandan soldiers in Darfur during the disagreements between the AU and the UN. An Egyptian medical team has begun work in the areas of Darfur controlled by the main faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement. The team was sent by the Arab League and the Egyptian Council for African Affairs. The Sudanese First VicePresident will visit Washington to discuss peace implementation and US aid to South Sudan. He will also request that economic sanctions be lifted and that Sudan be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Sudan has summoned the Eritrean ambassador to clarify Eritrea’s involvement with the rebel coalition the National Redemption Front, which was formed in the Eritrean capital last week. Eritrea has thus far declined to comment. International Activism Darfurian immigrants in London will hold a rally to protest the visit of the Sudanese minister of the interior. Alzubeir Beshir Taha is allegedly one of the 17 officials implicated by the UN in supporting the Janjaweed militia. He was invited to address a conference at the Royal United Services Institute. A 11th grade class from Montreal, accompanied by a rabbi from a Montreal synagogue, visited Parliament Hill in Ottawa to advocate for Darfur. The teens became interested in the issue after visiting concentration camps in Poland. After visiting the Sudan border with the International Medical Corps, a commercial photographer has been using his pictures to raise awareness of the Crisis in Darfur in the Hudson Valley region. His photos and speeches have inspired several churches and schools in the area to get involved with the issue. Special Reports Summary The Famine Early Warning System Network reported that rains are underway in South Darfur and southern West Darfur and that heavy rainfall is possible across southwestern Chad. Professor Eric Reeves called the events at the AU summit “an abject abandonment of ‘The Responsibility to Protect.’” Noting increasing violence, the collapsing peace agreement, and the complete inadequacy of the UN force, Reeves concluded, “It is difficult to see how the people of Darfur, and the humanitarians struggling heroically to save them, could have been more deeply betrayed at the African Union summit in Banjul, Gambia.” A USAID update on Sudan reported increases in the number of cases of malnutrition and acute watery diarrhea. Ronan Farrow, a representative of the Genocide Intervention Network, recently recounted the increasing rebel violence that he observed and its heavy toll on civilians. He believes that a UN force is desired by many groups of Darfurians but that it must be deployed before January. Addressing a conference in London, the Guardian’s Jonathan Steele warned that oversimplification of the situation in Darfur has prolonged the conflict. Although Steele placed most of the blame on the government of Sudan and Janjaweed militias, he claimed that some journalists have made “heroes” of the rebels. This has had the effect, he said, of encouraging these groups to keep fighting. G8 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search "Group of Eight" redirects here. For the Australian league of universities, see Group of Eight (Australian universities). For other uses, see G8 (disambiguation) and G7 (disambiguation). Current G8 Leaders G8 countries. Canada Prime Minister Stephen Harper France President Jacques Chirac Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel Italy Prime Minister Romano Prodi Japan Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Russia President Vladimir Putin (chair) United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair United States President George W. Bush The Group of Eight (G8) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Together, these countries represent about 65% of the world economy [1]. The hallmark of the G8 is an annual political summit meeting of the heads of government with international officials, though there are numerous subsidiary meetings and policy research. The Presidency of the group rotates every year. For 2006 it is held by Russia, and a 2006 summit of all G8 leaders will eventually be held in Saint Petersburg from July 15 to July 17 at the Palace of Congresses. Contents [hide] 1 Background and history 1.1 Participation of Russia and formation of the G8 2 Structure and activities 3 Criticism 4 Terrorism 5 Past G6/7/8 summits 6 Future summits 7 See also 8 References 9 External links 9.1 Governments 9.2 Comment 9.3 Earlier G8 Summit Activism 9.4 Current and Future G8 Summit Activism 9.5 African media coverage of G8 2005 [edit] Background and history The G8 has its roots in the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent global recession. These troubles led the United States to form the Library Group, a gathering of senior financial officials from the United States, Europe, and Japan, to discuss the economic issues. In 1975, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing invited the heads of state of six major industralized democracies to a summit in Rambouillet and proposed regular meetings. The participants agreed to an annual meeting organized under a rotating presidency, forming what was dubbed the Group of Six (G6) consisting of France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the subsequent annual summit in Puerto Rico, it became the Group of Seven (G7) when Canada joined at the behest of U.S. President Gerald Ford in 1976. The European Union has attended meetings since it was first invited by the United Kingdom in 1977. [edit] Participation of Russia and formation of the G8 G8 work session; July 2022, 2001.In 1991, following the end of the Cold War, the USSR (now Russia) began meeting with the G7 after the main summit. This group became known as the P8 (Political 8), or colloquially the "G7 plus 1", starting with the 1994 Naples summit. Russia was allowed to participate more fully beginning in the 1997 political summit, marking the creation of the Group of Eight or G8. Russia was not included in the meeting of financial officials as it is not a significant economic power; "G7" now refers specifically to the meeting of the respective Finance Ministers and Governors of the Central Banks. At the initiative of thenU.S. President Bill Clinton, "Group of Seven" became the "Group of Eight," with Russia attending most sessions. This was a gesture of appreciation from President Clinton to thenRussian President Boris Yeltsin for pursuing economic reforms, and for their neutrality with respect to the eastward expansion of NATO. On February 18, 2005, U.S. Senators Joe Lieberman (DCT) and John McCain (RAZ) called for Russia to be suspended from the G8 until democratic and political freedoms are ensured by Russian President Vladimir Putin. [edit] Structure and activities Official G8 2005 Portrait.The G8 is not supported by a transnational administration, unlike institutions such as the United Nations or World Bank. The presidency of the Group rotates among the member states annually, with the new president assuming his position on 1 January. The country holding the presidency hosts a series of ministeriallevel meetings leading up to a midyear threeday summit with the heads of government, and is responsible for the safety of the participants. The ministerial meetings bring together ministers in topics such as health, law enforcement, labour, development, energy, environment, foreign affairs, justice and interior, terrorism and trade to discuss issues of mutual or global concern. The best known of these is the G7, which now refers specifically to the annual meeting of the financial ministers of the G8 minus Russia, as well as officials from the European Community. However, there also is a briefer "G8+5" meeting for the finance ministers of the full G8, as well as the People's Republic of China, Mexico, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Under the auspices of G7 a special program for the implementation of the Information Society was established in 1994. The Global Information Society held meetings February 25 to February 26 in 1995 in Brussels and May 13 to May 15 in 1996 in South Africa. In June 2005 the G8 Justice and Interior ministers agreed to launch an international database on pedophiles, expected to be set up by the end of the year. Other countries may join later.[2] The G8 also agreed to pool data on terrorism, subject to the restrictions of the various countries' privacy and security laws. [3] In June 2005 the national science academies of the G8 nations and Brazil, the People's Republic of China and India, three of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the developing world, signed a statement on the global response to climate change. The statement stresses that the scientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking prompt action [4], and explicitly endorsed the IPCC consensus. [edit] Criticism Since the agenda of G8 is usually about controversial global issues, critics often refer to the G8 as an unofficial "world government." The annual summits are often the focus of antiglobalization movement protests, notably at the 27th G8 summit in Genoa in 2001. Critics assert that members of G8 are responsible for global issues such as global warming due to carbon dioxide emission, poverty in Africa and developing countries due to debt crisis and unfair trading policy, the AIDS problem due to strict medicine patent policy and other problems that are related to globalization. The debate drives discussions on property rights, global economics, international politics, morality and many other aspects. For example, some defenders believe that patent laws are essential property rights that encourage medical discovery to begin with. On the other hand, some critics say that parallel importation is a way out. Some others believe that African poverty is due to the rampant government corruption on that continent while some critics say it is a problem of unfair international trading. Most debate is related to discussions on globalization. Pressure has also been put on G8 leaders to take responsibility to combat problems they are criticized of creating. For example, Bob Geldof organized Live 8, global awareness concerts on July 2 and July 6 in 2005, to encourage G8 leaders to "Make Poverty History." Organizers have also proposed that G8 member nations adjust their national budgets to allow for 0.7% to go towards foreign aid as outlined in Agenda 21 of the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992. The concerts were timed to coincide with the 31st G8 summit. [edit] Terrorism Main article: 7 July 2005 London bombings The opening day of the 2005 G8 Summit in Scotland, 7 July 2005, was accompanied by a synchronized series of bombings in the London Underground and in a London doubledecker bus that claimed more than 50 lives and wounded hundreds more. Credit for the attacks was claimed by the "Secret Group of Al Qaeda's Jihad in Europe". The attacks are assumed to be in retaliation for the UK's participation in military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, although terrorism has been perpetrated against western states by Islamic fundamentalists prior to those actions. The global attention focused on the G8 summit was presumably leveraged by the terrorists for maximum symbolic effect. The strike also followed abruptly after the International Olympic Committee announced London as the site of the 2012 Olympic Games. Prime Minister Tony Blair denounced the attacks as 'barbaric', and returned to London to oversee the situation, but announced that the business of the summit would continue. [edit] Past G6/7/8 summits The location of the summit meetings rotate annually among member countries in the following order: France, United States of America, United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, (also the order in which each nation joined the Group, excluding Russia who joined last). Thousands of reporters descend on the summit site to cover the world's most powerful leaders. Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf: between a rock and a hard place Owen Bennett Jones, BBC World Service, and Farzana Shaikh, University of Cambridge and Chatham House Summary • Since the attacks on the United States in September 2001 President Musharraf has been caught between the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ and proIslamic parties in Pakistan. • While significant flows of US economic and military assistance to Pakistan have enabled Musharraf to resist pressure from his domestic critics by taking credit for his country’s economic stability, he still faces difficult choices. • Continuing unrest in neighbouring Afghanistan and the slow pace of peace talks with India mean that he may face growing opposition from powerful groups unwilling to countenance any weakening of Pakistan’s influence in the region or shift in the conduct of its regional policy. • Mindful of these risks, he has sought to chart an independent foreign policy by defying the United States and pursuing talks with Iran on the construction of a pipeline to allow the export of gas to India and Pakistan. • Despite the improving relations between Beijing and Delhi, Musharraf is determined to keep Pakistan’s status as China’s closest ally in the region. This is partly an attempt to recast Pakistan’s relations with the United States along more independent lines. • However, the impression of an independent foreign policy has been most dramatically conveyed by Musharraf’s unprecedented decision to formalize diplomatic contacts with Israel, which he hopes will establish his international reputation as a mature statesman. BRIEFING PAPER ASIA PROGRAMME ASP BP 06/01 MARCH 2006 2 Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf Introduction Foreign policy issues have twice come to the rescue of Pakistani military leaders. During the 1980s General Zia ul Haq was able to use American determination to remove the Soviet presence in Afghanistan to increase his international legitimacy and to improve Pakistan’s economic prospects. Since 9/11 General Pervez Musharraf has managed to pull off the same trick. Yet the dilemmas faced by President Musharraf are greater than those with which General Zia had to grapple. Like the US, Pakistan had a clear interest in opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. By contrast, even if Musharraf had little choice but to support the removal of the Taliban regime, in doing so he was reversing a longstanding effort by Islamabad to install a friendly government in Kabul. Furthermore, whereas Zia was able to improve his domestic political standing by pursuing a policy that enjoyed the support of Pakistan’s Islamic radicals, Musharraf has been forced to confront them at a time when militant Islam is becoming an ever stronger force. Musharraf faces another problem. In General Zia’s day, India leaned towards the Soviet Union and had cool relations with the US. Today Delhi is becoming a key economic partner of the United States. While 9/11 has forced the US to court Pakistan, the military regime in Islamabad knows that should there be any deterioration in its relationship with Washington, then India is poised to become the major US ally in South Asia. India’s growing economic might has also had regional implications. China’s longstanding hostility to India is being transformed by Beijing’s and Delhi’s mutual interest in improving their trading and wider bilateral relations. One issue that General Musharraf has in common with previous Pakistani leaders is the Kashmir dispute. Pakistani militants nurtured by the Pakistani state to fight in Kashmir have repeatedly tried to kill him. That and the sheer cost of the Kashmir dispute have given Pakistan a greater interest than ever in reaching a settlement. General Musharraf has offered a number of significant concessions on Kashmir but India has shown no sign of reciprocation and, consequently, the chances of the peace process succeeding are slim. United with the United States General Musharraf’s most important foreign policy decision was taken in a hurry. Within hours of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the US administration concluded that the attackers had probably originated from Afghanistan and that any effective counterattack would require the cooperation of Pakistan. At 8.00 am on 12 September the US Deputy of State, Richard Armitage, met the chief of Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence (ISI), Lt. General Mehmood Ahmed, who happened to be in Washington at the time. Armitage gave Pakistan a choice. Islamabad could align itself with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or with Washington. When that message was relayed to Islamabad, General Musharraf made a snap decision: Washington would get what it wanted. Two days later, at a meeting in Army House in Rawalpindi, Musharraf faced down senior colleagues, who would have preferred a more nuanced policy. The Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Muzaffar Usmani, for example, argued that Pakistan should wait to see exactly what Washington would offer in return for Islamabad’s cooperation. But Musharraf insisted there could be no delay. It took six hours for Pakistan’s President to get his way. He clinched the argument by pointing out that any Pakistani prevarication would present India with an opportunity to curry favour with the US. The Corps Commanders duly fell into line. When General Musharraf had seized power in October 1999 Pakistan’s economy was in dreadful shape. Although there was economic growth of 4.2%, the country had a budget deficit worth 6.1% of GDP and its external debt was unsustainable. Exports and remittances from abroad were falling and the IMF, the World Bank and bilateral donors had suspended their programmes with Pakistan after the 1998 nuclear tests. Debt servicing accounted for 50% of government revenues and, unable to meet its debt repayments, the country was on the verge of default.1 More than six years later the situation has improved significantly. In 2004/05 Pakistan achieved a growth rate of 8.4% and its budget deficit was estimated to be 3.2% of GDP. Debt servicing accounted for 25% of government revenues, in large part because by 2004 those revenues stood at Rs 600bn compared to Rs 391bn in 1999. Perhaps the most striking indicator of the change in Pakistan’s fortunes is the state of its foreign exchange reserves. In 1999 the Central Bank had just US$1.6bn to play with in servicing the country’s huge external debt. By October 2004 that had increased to US$12bn.2 The Pakistan government argues that these improving statistics are the result of its good management of the economy. But although Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz can take some of the credit, the biggest factor in rescuing Pakistan from bankruptcy has been the sharp increase in foreign economic assistance since 9/11 coupled with the lifting of the postnuclear test economic sanctions. Many donor nations have given aid or debt relief to Pakistan since 9/11 but, inevitably, the US has been the biggest single benefactor. Between 2002 and 2005 the US provided Pakistan with US$2.64bn in direct aid.3 In July 2002, the United States began allowing commercial sales that enabled Pakistan to refurbish its fleet of Americanmade F16 fighter aircraft. In June 2004, President Bush declared Pakistan to be a major nonNATO ally of the United States. Since July 2003, major US military grants and proposed sales to Pakistan have included C130 military transport aircraft, surveillance radars, helicopters and military radio systems meant to improve Pakistan’s ability to communicate with USled counterterrorist forces.4 Following the devastating earthquake that struck on 8 October 2005, General Musharraf postponed some military purchases because of the cost of earthquake relief, which the government has estimated at US$5bn but which many independent analysts believe will in reality be far higher.5 These economic benefits have been matched by increased international legitimacy for General Musharraf’s regime. Before 9/11 he was perceived as a military dictator who should announce, and abide by, a road map for the restoration of democracy. Since then his status has been transformed: the Western world has a stake in his survival. This status has been assiduously cultivated by Musharraf, who has projected his regime as the only reliable defence against a fundamentalist takeover in Pakistan. Since many Western and other international policymakers broadly accept that argument, the US and the Commonwealth have been unusually tolerant of Pakistan’s break with democracy. Indeed, Pakistan even managed to get away with little more than a diplomatic rap on the knuckles after the sensational revelation that its top nuclear scientist, Dr A.Q. Khan, had for years been proliferating nuclear weapons technology, probably with the knowledge of the army.6 General Musharraf knows that to maintain such international support he has to continue to be seen as an active participant in Washington’s ‘war on terror’. While the Bush administration has always provided the General with unqualified public backing, some in Washington have been suspicious of Islamabad’s motives since 9/11, arguing that it is only helping the US because it has little option and that Pakistan is far from serious about confronting the Islamic radicals in its midst.7 Pakistani army officers insist they are reliable allies. They argue that their commitment to attack Al Qaeda is demonstrated by the fact that in the campaign in Waziristan they have gone as far as bombing their own people in the effort to disrupt Al Qaeda’s operations. For their part, Pakistan’s critics argue that the military establishment in Rawalpindi has shown little desire to effectively tackle the remnants of the Taliban (see next section). Furthermore, cynics point out that the arrests of key AlQaeda figures in Pakistan have often been conveniently timed " coming shortly before senior US officials have visited Pakistan. For all that, at least a dozen such figures, including Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, who masterminded the attacks on New York and Washington, have been arrested and handed over to the US authorities. After the December 2003 assassination attempts on General Musharraf, orchestrated by Kashmiri militants, there was a real chance of Pakistan becoming more fully engaged in the ‘war on terror’. Much to the annoyance of the Pakistan army, some of those involved in the attacks came from groups such as LashkareToiba, which had an ongoing relationship with the ISI in order to further the struggle in Kashmir. The Pakistan army, however, has not gone as far as breaking completely with the Pakistanbased Kashmiri militant groups. Some US policymakers argue that the continued support for these groups will backfire on Pakistan because, as the Musharraf assassination attempts demonstrated, the militants will not restrict their activities to Kashmir. Notwithstanding such concerns there is, for the moment, no sign of a breach in US"Pakistan relations. Losing the Great Game At the time of General Musharraf’s 1999 coup, Pakistan’s influence over Afghanistan was at an alltime high. Competing regional powers with a history of interference in Afghan affairs, such as Russia and Iran, had been routed and 90% of the country was under Taliban control. Most senior Taliban officials had been educated in Pakistan and enjoyed close relations with the ISI, Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency. Better still from Islamabad’s point of view, the international isolation of the Taliban government, and its continuing conflict with the Northern Alliance, left it too weak to advance Afghan claims in the longrunning border dispute between Kabul and Islamabad.8 When he came to office General Musharraf was quite open in describing Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan. Islamabad, Musharraf argued, had always backed Pashtun regimes in Kabul: the alternative was to have a hostile Afghan administration filled with Tajiks and Uzbeks. With Mullah Omar in charge, Musharraf believed, Pakistan had strategic depth and his army could concentrate on guarding the border with India. Since then General Musharraf has seen Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan sharply curtailed. After 9/11 the Taliban were swept from power and replaced by Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf 3 Northern Alliance warlords and politicians who expressed open hostility to Pakistan. Pakistan has reacted to these developments with a twotrack policy. On the one hand it has expressed support for President Karzai and, at the behest of the Americans, made occasional arrests of Taliban officials. On the other it has kept open the option of benefiting from any revival in the Taliban’s fortunes.9 There have been consistent rumours that the ISI is still in contact with some elements of the Taliban. Pakistan is acutely aware that, after the collapse of Soviet power in Afghanistan in 1988, the Americans rapidly lost interest in South Asia. Islamabad fears a repeat performance and the consequent resurgence of warlordism in Afghanistan. It calculates that even if the Taliban appears to be a spent force at the moment, in the future and perhaps in some other guise, it may possibly be able to mount a challenge to the warlords and give Pakistan the chance of once again having a friendly government in place in Kabul. Aware of this Pakistani strategy, Washington and London have tried to convince Islamabad that their interest in the region will not wane " an interest reiterated in February 2006 by their endorsement of the Afghan Compact. They also insist that their support of President Karzai’s administration, and what it represents, will last for decades. Some elements of the ISI, and some senior army officers, however, remain unconvinced and would prefer Pakistan to keep its options open.10 Pipe(line) dreams India’s natural gas consumption has risen faster than any other fuel in recent years and the trend is set to continue. Bearing in mind India’s economic growth projections, the US predicts a 4.8% annual growth rate in natural gas consumption.11 Iran could supply much of that gas. For over a decade now the two countries have been considering three possible transport routes for Iranian gas exports to India: shipping it through the Arabian Sea; a deep sea pipeline; and a 2,600 km pipeline from southern Iran which would run across 750 km of Pakistani territory. Compared with the shipping option, the land pipeline would save India US$1"2bn annually.12 In January 2005 Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz described the pipeline proposal as a ‘winwin situation for all, as we believe that creating interdependence between different countries will help promote peace…’.13 The benefits to Pakistan are clear. First, the pipeline would secure some of its own supply needs: although twothirds of the gas would be delivered to India, the remainder would go to Pakistan. Secondly, Islamabad would receive transit fees and taxes worth US$9bn over the first 30 years.14 Thirdly, the pipeline would give Pakistan some control over India’s energy supply and would help ensure Pakistan’s involvement in what it sees as a potentially troublesome relationship between Tehran and Delhi. Islamabad fears that closer cooperation between the two governments could leave it isolated. Although Pakistan has tried to maintain good relations with Iran, there are tensions. The two countries have conflicting interests in Afghanistan and Islamabad fears Iran’s capacity to sponsor sectarian violence in Pakistan. There are a number of obstacles that could prevent the pipeline being built. Baluch insurgents pose a clear security threat: the pipeline would run through areas in which Pakistan’s central government does not have, and never has had, complete control.15 For India and Iran the question is clear. Could Pakistan secure a pipeline? Tribal leaders have made it clear they object to any energy projects in their areas, let alone any tied to megaprojects such as the construction of a deepsea port at Gwadur which, they believe, will attract outsiders from elsewhere in Pakistan and reduce the Baluch to a minority in their own province. But perhaps the biggest obstacle is presented by the United States, which wants to deny Iran gas export revenues. In June 2005 Washington told both Pakistan and India that they could face sanctions if they went ahead with the project. And in January 2006 Washington reinforced that message, saying it was ‘absolutely opposed’ to the project.16 The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, has acknowledged that US objections could make it impossible to finance the pipeline. ‘We are terribly short of our energy supply,’ he said. But, he added: ‘I am realistic enough to realize that there are many risks because considering all the uncertainties of the situation there in Iran, I don’t know if any international consortium of backers would underwrite this.’17 Pakistan insists that it still wants to go ahead. Shortly after Washington expressed its absolute opposition, Iran and Pakistan held two days of talks in Islamabad on 23"24 January 2006 to discuss how to push the project forward.18 Pakistan has said it would still like to have Iranian gas supplies even without Indian involvement. The US is trying to help Delhi find alternative sources of energy supply. In July 2005 Washington put its nuclear nonproliferation concerns to one side and agreed to cooperate with Delhi’s civil nuclear energy programmes allowing US companies to build nuclear power plants in India, and also supply fuel for nuclear reactors.19 Delhi clearly values such cooperation with the US highly, choosing in February 2006 to vote in favour of an International Atomic 4 Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution calling for Iran’s nuclear activities to be referred to the UN Security Council. Arguably India’s energy demand will leave it no choice but to participate in the pipeline project. But the prize of nuclear cooperation with the US may be enough to persuade Delhi to at least postpone the idea of buying Iranian gas. Such an outcome would leave Pakistan in an awkward position. Not only would it lose the prospect of earning the transit fees, it would also be left to face US opposition to the pipeline alone. India: enduring rivalry or irreversible peace? It is still far from clear whether General Musharraf is serious about resolving the Kashmir dispute. The lack of any substantive progress has fuelled speculation that his main objective is to use dialogue with India not so much to reach a settlement over Kashmir but to burnish his country’s image as a responsible player on the world stage and to build international support for his militaryled regime. Yet most analysts agree that Musharraf has moved further from Pakistan’s established positions on Kashmir than any of his predecessors. His determination to break the deadlock surfaced early, leading in July 2001 to his highly publicized meeting in Agra with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. Although Musharraf appeared at the time to be naïve in his expectations of that illfated encounter, it is clear with hindsight that his decision marked a significant watershed in the process of normalizing relations with India. It is now generally acknowledged that, as a military leader, Musharraf has enjoyed far more room for manoeuvre on Kashmir than any civilianled government in Pakistan.20 Enduring structural imbalances in the civilian"military equation mean that the army has exercised, and will continue to exercise, a decisive role in determining policy on Kashmir, including retaining a veto over any peace process. Indeed, shortly after he became the army chief under Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf refused to endorse the government’s decision to hold talks with Prime Minister Vajpayee in Lahore in February 1999. In May of that year he further sabotaged the peace process by ordering his troops, backed by Pakistanibased Islamic militants, to infiltrate into Indianheld territory of Kargil in Kashmir.21 The issue of what India calls ‘crossborder terrorism’, involving attacks by Kashmiri militants groups against Indian targets, remains a major obstacle to a peace settlement. This was vividly demonstrated when Pakistanbased militants attacked the Indian parliament building in Delhi in December 2001. India responded by massing hundreds of thousands of troops on its border with Pakistan while some Indian leaders called openly for a ‘decisive battle’. They included Prime Minister Vajpayee who, in a broadcast to the nation on 13 December 2001 in which he roundly condemned the terrorist attack, declared that ‘our fight is now entering the last stage, and a decisive battle [will] have to take place’.22 Western capitals took the threat seriously, unleashing a period of intense diplomatic engagement. The tense military standoff lasted ten months before both sides finally agreed in October 2002 to start reducing troop deployments along their borders. Though Musharraf has since formally undertaken to rein in militant (jihadi) groups active in Kashmir, India claims that Pakistan has still not taken any ‘significant action’ to ‘dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism … such as launching pads, training camps, communications and funding’.23 Musharraf has strongly rejected these allegations. But it is clear that so long as Pakistanibased militants fuel violence in Kashmir, doubts will persist about Musharraf’s real commitment to peace and serve as a potent reminder of his antiIndian stance in the past. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri militant groups has been severely constrained by its status as a key US ally in the ‘war on terror’. Since 9/11 many Kashmiri groups, which Pakistan long favoured as ‘freedom fighters’, have featured prominently on US government terrorist watchlists or had their assets frozen after being classed as proscribed organizations. There are also indications that some groups have been forced by Pakistan to suspend their operations in Kashmir under pressure from the United States.24 But while Musharraf clearly exercises some degree of control over militant groups he faces significant domestic constraints, not least popular support for the militants’ campaign, which has sharply restricted his freedom to call it off permanently. Indeed, the degree to which Musharraf’s government is still hostage to threats from militants was demonstrated in November 2005 when carefully timed bomb blasts in Delhi, blamed on the banned Kashmiri militant group LashkariTayyaba, nearly ruined an agreement with India to open the Line of Control (LOC) for the first time since 1947 and allow Kashmiri families affected by the earthquake to reunite with their families. The Bush administration is itself constrained by its dependence on Pakistan in the ‘war on terror’. Given this, it seems that any real shift in Pakistan’s posture will be internally driven: the 2003 assassination attempts against Musharraf, which infuriated the army Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf 5 high command, could trigger just the break with past policy necessary for a genuine settlement on Kashmir. Certainly, from 2003 onwards, there have been significant developments in Kashmir. These have included greater ‘peopletopeople’ contact including the resumption of bus services between Lahore and Delhi and, more recently, Amritsar and Lahore; the introduction of a similar service across the LOC in Kashmir and the restoration of a rail link across the Wagah border. They marked the runup to a formal agreement in January 2004 between Musharraf and Vajpayee at a meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Islamabad " their first since Agra " to continue a ‘composite dialogue’ on Kashmir and all other outstanding bilateral issues. To the surprise of some, the process survived Vajpayee’s fall from power and in September 2004 led to fresh talks between Musharraf and the new Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, in the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. Negotiations resumed in April 2005 after Musharraf visited Delhi and declared in a joint statement with Singh that the bilateral peace process was now ‘irreversible’. Since then IndoPakistani relations appear to have moved along three parallel tracks. The first, ‘composite dialogue’, has shown little progress with no agreement yet despite several rounds of talks in 2005 on troop withdrawals from the remote Siachen Glacier region; the demarcation of the Sir Creek border in the Rann of Kutch or an agreement on the Baglihar Dam project in Indiancontrolled Kashmir. The second track, ‘confidencebuilding measures’, which includes a ban on nuclear weapons tests and reciprocal advance warning of missile tests, appears to have made greater headway. The third and most crucial track pertaining to the ‘core issue’ of Kashmir is being pursued behind closed doors with little or no indication yet of the ground covered. At the same time, it is clear that Pakistan has made important concessions on Kashmir. They include Musharraf’s announcement in 2004 that Pakistan could envisage circumstances in which it might choose to drop its demand for a UN plebiscite in Kashmir in return for a durable peace. This significant gesture, not surprisingly, prompted a sharp political reaction in Pakistan. Musharraf has since hinted that his country could also relax its insistence on thirdparty mediation in settling the dispute over Kashmir. Humanitarian considerations after the earthquake have undoubtedly softened Pakistan’s position, despite security concerns that opening the LOC would give India the opportunity to engage in surveillance of territory it suspects is still used by Kashmiri rebel groups to stage crossborder raids.25 This has been followed more recently by Musharraf’s fresh proposals to demilitarize Kashmir and to open talks on selfrule for Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC. By contrast, India appears to have given little in return to Pakistan beyond engagement in an openended process of ‘substantive dialogue’. In reality, of course, neither side has honoured its commitments. Pakistan has, from time to time, allowed infiltrations across the LOC to resume while India has not yet come close to making an offer on Kashmir that would allow General Musharraf to sell a settlement to the army, the Pakistani people and to Kashmiri militant leaders. The absence of any movement on the part of India, publicly at least, could also mean that prospects for a significant breakthrough in the short to medium term are likely to remain slim. Chinese designs Islamabad’s status as a key ally of Washington, coupled with a thaw in contacts between India and China, have put unprecedented strain on the socalled ‘timetested friendship’ between Pakistan and China. Beijing is concerned not only by Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States over Afghanistan but also by reports that the US has been granted permission to establish listening posts in Pakistan’s Northern Areas bordering the western Chinese province of Xinjiang and Tibet. The agreement between India and China in 2003"04 to settle their border disputes is also being carefully watched by Pakistan, which fears that it could alter the balance of power in the region, where Pakistan’s China policy has long been predicated on the dictum ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’. It is clear that Pakistan is extremely reluctant to surrender the strategic and material benefits that it gains from close relations with China. Although Chinese (and North Korean) support for the development of Pakistan’s missile programme appears to have tapered off, doubts remain about current levels of Chinese assistance. In 2003 a CIA report to Congress raised questions about China’s commitment to missile nonproliferation by claiming that China has continued to transfer ballistic missile technology and export missile parts to Pakistan.26 More recently, the two countries have also initiated joint naval exercises. Launched in Shanghai in October 2003 as the first ever exercises of their kind between China and a foreign navy, they were resumed off the southern coast of Pakistan in late 2005.27 Meanwhile unconfirmed reports indicate that Pakistan is considering the purchase of up to half a dozen nuclear reactors from China, worth an estimated US$10bn. General Musharraf is no less concerned with exploiting his country’s longstanding relations with China in the field of economic cooperation. His main 6 Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf 7 focus is the Gwadur port project, said to be China’s ‘pearl’ in Pakistani waters.28 Inaugurated in March 2002, its total cost is currently estimated at more than US$1.1bn. The first phase of the project, completed ahead of schedule in January 2005, benefited from Chinese assistance totalling almost US$200m. The second phase, also to be completed with Chinese finance, involves an ambitious roadbuilding scheme linking Gwadur with the Karakoram Highway in northern Pakistan to facilitate the movement of Chinese imports and exports.29 It is estimated that total Chinese investment in Pakistan in 2005 stood at some US$4bn (a rise of 30% since 2003) with Chinese companies (employing 3,000 Chinese nationals in Pakistan) accounting for almost 12% of all foreign firms in the country.30 In 2005 alone China and Pakistan signed 22 trade agreements, including the joint production of a jet fighter and the sale of four Chinese navy frigates to Pakistan.31 These gains could be threatened, however, if Musharraf’s government fails to protect Chinese interests from becoming the targets of insurgents in Baluchistan. In May 2004 China protested strongly against the killing by insurgents from the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) of three Chinese engineers working on the Gwadur project. It has since expressed shock at the shooting dead of another three Chinese engineers employed by a local cement plant in Hub, near Karachi, in February 2006. Attacks against Chinese workers have already forced China to withdraw its involvement in the construction of the Gomal Zam dam project in South Waziristan, where proIslamic Pashtun militants in 2004 had abducted two Chinese workers, one of whom was killed during a botched rescue attempt by Pakistani security forces. Some analysts have since blamed the attacks in Waziristan on China’s treatment of its Uighur Muslim population in western Xinjiang province, where the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) " banned by both Pakistan and China " is fighting against the governmentsponsored settlement of Han Chinese in the province.32 Tens of thousands of displaced Uighur Muslims are said to have now sought refuge in Pakistan, where they are concentrated mainly in Karachi and Lahore. Finding friends in Jerusalem Among Musharraf’s boldest foreign policy moves was the decision in 2005 publicly to open diplomatic talks with Israel. Although it is known that both countries had informally pursued relations since the late 1980s, no government until now has been willing to confront an Islamist backlash on this issue. However, mounting concern inside Pakistan’s defence establishment over close military and intelligence cooperation between Israel and India,33 combined with Musharraf’s own readiness to stand up to Islamist parties following their poor showing in recent and controversial local elections,34 paved the way for an endeavour that is expected to yield significant dividends for Pakistan. Among these are access to the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States, which Musharraf hopes will relax its opposition to US arms sales to Pakistan and permit Pakistan’s entry into a USled elite club, including Israel and India, which it is assumed share common security perceptions.35 It is not clear yet what impact these diplomatic initiatives are likely to have on Pakistan’s relations with the Muslim world. Although key members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), notably Saudi Arabia, were said to have given their approval to formal contacts between Pakistan and Israel and the Palestinian Authority, notified in advance of the meeting between the Pakistani and Israeli foreign ministers in Istanbul, there is concern that Pakistan’s powerful neighbour Iran takes a dim view of this rapprochement. Iran fears that, with Iraq brought to its knees, Israel has now set its sights on containing Iran’s regional ambitions with the help of Pakistan (in much the same way that Israel seeks to contain Iran’s global ambitions as a nuclear power with the help of the United States). These fears may be unfounded. Pakistan has long viewed Iran’s regional ambitions with suspicion. Tension was particularly acute following the 1979 Iranian revolution, when Pakistan sought to counter the appeal of Iranianinspired Shia extremism among its own Shia minority by consolidating its Sunni identity through a statesponsored programme of Islamization. Although it has now also been officially confirmed that Pakistan shared nuclear weapons technology with Iran for more than two decades after the Iranian revolution, much of this exchange is understood to have been concentrated in the period 198995 " a time when Pakistan was keen to get back at the United States for using its services in Afghanistan and then imposing sanctions on it for pursuing a nuclear weapons programme.36 Since then relations with Iran soured again over Pakistan’s support for the Sunnidominated Taliban. Iran retaliated by strengthening ties with India. Although Pakistan’s decision to abandon its pro Taliban policy in 2001 has restored a degree of mutual confidence in bilateral relations and helped drive negotiations over the proposed oil pipeline from Iran through Pakistan to India, trust between the two sides is still fragile. Pakistan remains deeply wary of Iran’s expanding ties with India and has accused Iran of fomenting unrest in Baluchistan, where the development of Gwadur is seen to be in direct competition with the Iranian port city of Chabahar and where a large Hazara Shia population in the provincial capital, Quetta, is believed to be vulnerable to Iranian influence. Iran, for its part, blames Pakistan for facilitating a dominant US presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia and cooperating with the United States against it to ensure the supremacy of Israel in the Middle East. Conclusion General Musharraf faces some tough choices in the wake of major international developments and shifts within the South Asian region since 9/11 " choices that could determine the very survival of his regime. While it is clear that his staying power depends upon a close alliance with the United States in the ‘war on terror’, he cannot afford to abandon his support for militant groups in Kashmir without risking his political credibility (and possibly his physical safety) at home. However, attempts by the United States to strengthen India’s position as the main regional power in South Asia have prompted Musharraf to try to steer a more independent foreign policy predicated on strengthening ties with other major powers, especially China, refusing to surrender influence in Afghanistan and boldly initiating contacts with Israel. The aim is to pacify critics at home without endangering his international standing as the selfavowed champion of 'enlightened moderation'. 8 Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf Endnotes 1 Ishrat Husain, Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, February 2005, bis/review/r050217g.pdf. 2 Ibid. 3 K. Alan Kronstadt, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief for Congress: Pakistan"US Relations. Available on fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/42021.pdf. A further US$797m in economic and military assistance to Pakistan is planned for FY2006. 4 Kronstadt, PakistanUS Relations. 5 Farzana Shaikh, ‘Peace amid the ruins’, The World Today, 61(12), December 2005, p. 20. 6 For a background to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme see Owen BennettJones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 187"222; and Farzana Shaikh, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear bomb: beyond the nonproliferation regime’, International Affairs, 78 (1), January 2002, pp. 29"48. 7 See for example Leon T. Hadar, Pakistan in America’s War against Terrorism: Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client?, Cato Policy Analysis No. 436, cato/pubs/pas/pa436es.html. 8 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords (Basingstoke: Pan Macmillan, 2001), pp. 183"95. 9 For a compelling account and analysis of Pakistan’s continuing and controversial involvement in Afghan affairs and US concerns about it (notwithstanding Musharraf’s dramatic but untenable proposal to build a fence sealing off his country’s border to curb infiltration into Afghanistan), see Amir Mir, ‘Janusfaced counterterrorism’, Asia Times On Line, 21 September 2005, atimes/atimes/South_Asia/GI21Df02.html. See also, Ahmed Rashid, ‘Islamabad’s lingering support for Islamic extremists threatens PakistanAfghanistan ties’, 23 July 2003, eurasianet/departments/insight/articles/eav072303a.shtml. 10 A recent editorial in the highly respected Daily Times of Pakistan’s observed ‘the fact that most Pakistanis … hate the NATO presence in Afghanistan and are leery of the Karzai government’s credentials as a controlling authority in the Afghan territory’. See ‘IndiaAfghan “action” in Baluchistan’, Daily Times (Lahore), 8 February 2006. 11 Energy Information Administration of US Department of Energy. See eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/india.html. 12 Toufiq A. Siddiqi, ‘India and Pakistan: pipe dream or pipeline of peace?’, Georgetown Journal, 5(1), Winter/Spring 2004, pp. 35"42. Available on journal.georgetown.edu/Issues/ws04/siddiqilocked.pdf . 13 See report of Shaukat Aziz’s press conference at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Washington Times/UPI, 30 January 2005. Available on washtimes/upibreaking/200501280111548034r.htm. 14 Siddiqi, ‘India and Pakistan’. 15 In a recent analysis of Baluch opposition to government plans, including the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to India, the French expert Frédéric Grare observes: ‘Today’s crisis in Baluchistan was provoked, ironically, by the central government’s attempt to develop this backward area by undertaking large projects. Instead of cheering these projects, the Baluch … responded with fear that they would be dispossessed of their land and resources… An insurrection in Baluchistan would harm [the] chances of building a gas pipeline through the province’. See Frédéric Grare, Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Paper 65, January 2006, carnegieendowment/files/CP65.Grare.FINAL.pdf. 16 english.ohmynews/articleview/article_view.asp?no=268080&rel_no=1. 17 Washington Post, 20 July 2005. 18 payvand/news/06/jan/1216.html. 19 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4362884.stm. 20 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, India and Pakistan: Is Peace Real This Time?, 2004, carnegieendowment/pdf/files/IndiaPakistan.pdf. 21 BennettJones, Pakistan, pp. 87"104. 22 The Hindu (Chennai), 14 December 2001. 23 Statement by Indian State Minister for External Affairs, Daily Times (Lahore), 2 December 2005. 24 See Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), pp. 226"7. 25 Shaikh, ‘Peace amid the ruins’, pp. 19"20. Pakistan’s foreign policy under Musharraf 9 26 ‘Unclassified report to Congress on the acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions: 1 January through 30 June 2003’, Central Intelligence Agency, cia.gov./cia/reports/721_reports/jan_june2003.htm. See also T. V. Paul, ‘The enduring SinoPakistani nuclear/missile relationship and the balance of power logic’, Nonproliferation Review, 10, Summer 2003, pp. 1"9. 27 Dawn (Karachi), 25 November 2005. 28 See Net Assessment report for US Defence Department, cited in Washington Times, 18 January 2005. 29 Tarique Niazi, ‘Gwadar: China naval outpost on the Indian Ocean’, Association for Asian Research (AFAR), 2 February 2005, asian research.articles/2528.html. 30 Ibid. 31 Declan Walsh, ‘US uneasy as Beijing develops a strategic string of pearls’, The Guardian, 10 October 2005. 32 See Amir Mir, ‘And now, a Chinese alQaeda?’, Newsline, December 2005. 33 N. Ejaz Haider, ‘IndoIsrael relations: what should Pakistan do?’ The Friday Times, Vol. XII, No. 19, 7"13 July 2000. 34 International Crisis Group, Pakistan’s Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, Report No. 43, 22 November 2005. 35 Farzana Shaikh, ‘Across the divide’, The World Today, 61(10), October 2005. 36 Sudha Ramachandran, ‘“Brothers” in arms’, Asia Times Online, 18 March 2005, atimes/atimes/South_Asia/GC18Df06.html. Owen Bennett Jones is a correspondent for the BBC World Service and author of Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002). Dr Farzana Shaikh is at the Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge and an Associate Fellow of the Asia Programme at Chatham House. Her book Making Sense of Pakistan is to be published by Hurst. Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) is an independent body which promotes the rigorous study of international questions and does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the authors. © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2006. This material is offered free of charge for personal and noncommercial use, provided the source is acknowledged. For commercial or any other use, prior written permission must be obtained from the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In no case may this material be altered, sold or rented. Chatham House 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE T: +44 (0) 20 7957 5700 F: +44 (0) 20 7957 5710 chathamhouse.uk Charity Registration No: 208 223 The Asia Programme at Chatham House undertakes original research, in partnership with institutions and regional specialists, on key political, economic and security issues affecting Asia. The work is interdisciplinary, has a strong policy bent, and aims to stimulate public understanding of the issues raised by Asia’s development. See chathamhouse.uk/index.php?id=87 for more information. Leading articles The Times July 08, 2006 Time for the G10 If the G8 wants to stay useful, it must get bigger Delegates to the G8 summit in St Petersburg next week will, for the first time, be able to convert their spending money into roubles and back, as they would with any other serious currency. If they (or their stockbrokers) are alert and fond of risk, they may also be able to snap up shares in the statebacked Rosneft oil group, which hopes to start raising $10 billion on the London Stock Exchange on the first day of the summit. Such are the public faces of the “state capitalism” that forms one of the two big planks of what history may well call Putinism. The other plank is “managed democracy”, which was less conspicuously on show in the recent arrest, well to the north of the Arctic Circle, of Russia’s last elected regional governor. President Putin’s overarching goal in St Petersburg is for Russia to be taken seriously by the industrialised West. To this end, with the help of a newly hired US public relations firm, he is promoting the notion of Russia as a benevolent “energy superpower”. Yet his democratic credentials are less impressive than ever, and his recent characterisation of President Bush as “Comrade Wolf” raises serious questions about both his world view and his diplomatic judgment. Russia can certainly claim to be an energy superpower. It also has the potential to become a paranoid autocracy. As a result, questions about whether it should be a member of the G8 at all have so far eclipsed those about whether this year’s meeting might achieve anything useful in terms of energy security or the containment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In fact, there is only one safe bet as to the outcome of this summit: there will be no concerted effort to suspend Russia’ s membership. Nor should there be. The G8 trumpets its meetings and agendas as those of the world’s leading industrialised democracies. It was therefore appropriate, when Russia was invited to join as a permanent member in 1998, that it pledged explicitly to move towards a pluralist political system, strengthen the rule of law, build a truly independent judiciary and strive to integrate with the global economy. Mr Putin has delivered only on the last of these, but to uninvite him because of a lack of progress on the first three would still be pointless. The G8 has evolved from an informal forum for the leaders of France, Germany, Britain and the US to coordinate their management of global economic challenges. It was also, initially, a quintessentially Cold War device to include, in toplevel international discussion, the two leading capitalist economies excluded from the UN Security Council " Germany and, later, Japan. It was never conceived, despite appearances and abundant good intentions at Gleneagles last year, as a vehicle for the harnessing of diffuse idealism to save the world. If the G8 is to be both relevant and effective, aligning the macroeconomic interests of the world’s great industrial powers must remain its chief raison d’etre, however stunted or suppressed the democratic yearnings of those powers. And to perform this task, China and India must join the group. Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, has a chance to put good governance on the agenda when she chairs the 2007 summit, and she should take advantage of Mr Putin’s fluent German to talk frankly to him about the democratic imperative. And they should discuss how the G8 would be a lot more effective as the G10. Comment The Times July 08, 2006 Trident, Iraq, Helmand: all the wrong paths but carry on anyway, chaps Matthew Parris SELDOM HAVE there been finer examples than this July of the propensity of humans and our institutions to reinforce failure. We carry on marching towards what we suspect is the abyss for little better reason than that it would be embarrassing to break ranks. Betrothed to our own doom, we shrink from breaking off the engagement because the wedding ring has been purchased, the deposit on the marquee is nonreturnable and the bride’s mother would be devastated. Here we go again with a revamping of Britain’s Trident missile system. It will cost about £20 billion " nearly a penny on income tax " and few can see much use for it, but it’s the soft path between two hard alternatives: the development of a new and truly independent nuclear weapons system; or the permanent abandonment of Britain’s nuclear capability. A new nuclear deterrent (perhaps battlefield or tactical) might have some place in 21stcentury theatres of war but would cost more than Trident. A nonnuclear future could rechannel huge resources into our cashstrapped and overstretched conventional Armed Forces " but would cause a ghastly political stink at home. So we shall this year decide to take the most pointless course available. Spare us the “debate”, Tony. The outcome is certain. And here goes the Labour Party towards Gordon Brown as its next leader. Already he looks crumpled and washedup. Already Labour MPs in English marginal seats know he’s not the man to trump David Cameron. Already Westminster suspects he has run out of ideas before his first Queen’s Speech; hardly the leader to “renew” his party. But Mr Brown has (sort of) been promised the job, senior colleagues have (sort of) ruled themselves out of a challenge, junior colleagues have (sort of) committed themselves to him. And MPs can’t swing it unless the unions and grass roots swing too, and unions and grass roots won’t swing unless MPs swing first, and . . . oh heck, it’s all too late, brothers. So off they march, towards the sunset of a hung parliament. And here we go into another couple of years of being shot at and bombed in Iraq. There’s a paralysing weariness about even debating this any more. Most of the British press haven’t even bothered to report the news that the US military has finally decided to give up trying to control one big, festering sore, Ramadi, and instead to establish a mini“greenzone” there " climb into it, and stay there. Increasingly the allies’ military effort is devoted to the defence of our own garrisons. Such a posture is sustainable indefinitely. Too much danger attaches to any push to regain the initiative and too much face would be lost by admitting defeat, so we settle into the worst of both worlds " paying tribute each week at Prime Minister’s Questions to this week’s fallen servicemen. But " hey " drifting up the proverbial creek is not unpleasant. A century and a half ago, Leopold von Ranke, arguably the father of modern historiography, put it like this: “Neither blindness nor ignorance corrupts people and governments. They soon realise where the path they have taken is leading them. But there is an impulse within them, favoured by their natures and reinforced by their habits, which they do not resist; it continues to propel them forward . . . He who overcomes himself is divine. Most see their ruin before their eyes; but they go on into it.” Which brings us to Afghanistan. I see that both of last week’s sad British casualties in Afghanistan got a generous personal tribute, by name, from the Prime Minister at Questions on Wednesday. Opposition leaders then felt obliged to echo him. It will be interesting to see whether the most recent death " the sixth soldier now killed there " gets the same treatment at the next PMQs. Are the names of each soldier who falls now to be read out by the Prime Minister? When did the practice start? Will it apply to police officers and firemen too? Would it be horribly cynical to wonder whether Mr Blair has noticed what others have: that whenever he opens his remarks with a solemn tribute to the deceased, he effectively wrongfoots anyone planning to be rude to him? Visitors to the Strangers’ Gallery on Wednesday may have supposed they were witnessing an ancient parliamentary tradition but I think the practice is new: it was certainly never the routine. And at what, if any, level of British casualties might it be suspended? Ten? Twenty? A hundred? For be sure of this: if Parliament is to have any time at all left for discussion, Mr Speaker had better give some thought to a cutoff point. As Ben Macintyre pointed out on these pages yesterday, the Soviet Union lost 15,000 men in Afghanistan, killing a million Afghans before giving up. Talking to my Ukrainian guide in the Carpathian Mountains a couple of years ago, I discovered he had been in Afghanistan. “Fantastic!” I said. “Not fantastic,” he replied. Involuntarily his face knotted with something harder than misery: a sort of ferocious loathing. This was as hardassed, superfit and daring a fellow as you are likely to meet. Up for anything, Stas was not up for Afghanistan. In The Times six months ago I tried to explain why the proposed push into Helmand province would prove a mistake. To what Ben wrote about the awful history of British occupation in Afghanistan I can add nothing. Nor, after some modest journeying in Afghanistan 18 months ago, should I set myself up as some kind of old Afghan hand. But within a few days ministers will doubtless be announcing a substantial reinforcement of British forces so " even as (in von Ranke’s words) we go on into our ruin " I shall venture three thoughts. First, the Russians. It is not appreciated among neoconservatives that what many ordinary Afghans really detested about Soviet rule was the attempt to liberate Afghans " and specifically Afghan women " from a conservative Islamic culture. Let Western liberal interventionists boast about all the girls now attending schools in Afghanistan if they like, but the first liberalinterventionist “rescue” of the oppressed in that country was attempted by the Soviet Union, and the oppressed declined to be rescued. Secondly, the Taleban. I am not so naive as to miss the fact that a ruthless and organised grouping called the Taleban exists. But around that core is a wider and more pervasive force that is not so much an organisation as a habit of mind and belief. Any Afghan can become Taleban " can slip into or out of the state. Someone I got to know well there was on the edge of it. He was not (yet) hostile to the West, but he hated to see women unveiled, driving cars or laughing in the street; and he hated rule by foreigners. There is a calamitous error at the heart of American thinking: that if you kill a hundred Taleban, there are a hundred fewer. Wrong. There may be two hundred more. Thirdly, the Conservative Party. With sinking heart I realise that when reinforcements are announced by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, the only question from Liam Fox, his Tory Shadow, will be whether there shouldn’t be even more. Up the creek the Cameroons will go (just as Iain Duncan Smith did over Iraq) until to criticise the deployment in principle will look like a late and hypocritical Uturn. Yet a perfectly Tory way to step aside from this dismal path is available: declare that this is so imponderable a burden that we cannot " should not even begin to " shoulder it alone. We must first secure promises of a matching contribution from all our main European Nato allies. Until then we cannot increase our own troops’ exposure in Afghanistan. I doubt Dr Fox will say any such thing. Nor will British ministers. Seeing their ruin before their eyes, they will go on into it. Mexican cliffhanger (Filed: 08/07/2006) Comment on this story Read comments The fate of Mexico is of acute concern to the United States. The two countries share a border nearly 2,000 miles long, across which each year pour smuggled cocaine and around 400,000 illegal immigrants. Since 1994, they have been linked, with Canada, in the North American Free Trade Agreement; the closeness of that relationship was shown in 1995 when Bill Clinton bailed Mexico out of a currency crisis by decreeing $20 billion of emergency aid. Stability across the Rio Grande is one of Washington's prime foreignpolicy goals. Looking south today, the Americans can take heart from the maturing of Mexican democracy, which has seen the decline of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) from a seemingly permanent holder of power to third place in both presidential and congressional elections. And that maturity has so far been evident in the cliffhanging result of last Sunday's race for the presidency. The Federal Election Institute announced on Thursday that the ruling party candidate, Felipe Calderón, had beaten his Leftwing challenger, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, by only 236,006 votes, or 0.57 per cent. Mr López Obrador is to challenge these figures before the electoral tribunal and has called for a rally in Mexico City today. It is incumbent on him to ensure that this is not an occasion for violence. For whichever man eventually wins, the prospect is daunting. He will inherit a country more deeply divided than at any time since the 1910 revolution. And he will be hampered by the lack of a clear majority in Congress in tackling monopolistic practice, rigid labour markets, poor state education and drugrelated violence. Six years after the PRI lost its 71year hold on power, democracy is holding up well. But, after the closest election in Mexican history, it is facing an unprecedented challenge. Watchers north of the border have good grounds for nervousness. Comment Mexico and Florida have more in common than heat There is evidence that leftleaning voters have been scrubbed from key electoral lists in Latin America Greg Palast Saturday July 8, 2006 The Guardian There's something rotten in Mexico. And it smells like Florida. The ruling party, the Washingtonfriendly National Action Party (Pan), proclaimed yesterday their victory in the presidential race, albeit tortilla thin, was Mexico's first "clean" election. But that requires we close our eyes to some very dodgy doings in the vote count that are far too reminiscent of the games played in Florida in 2000 by the Bush family. And indeed, evidence suggests that Team Bush had a hand in what may be another presidential election heist. Article continues Just before the 2000 balloting in Florida, I reported in the Guardian that its governor, Jeb Bush, had ordered the removal of tens of thousands of black citizens from the state's voter rolls. He called them "felons", but our investigation discovered their only crime was Voting While Black. And that little scrub of the voter rolls gave the White House to his brother George. Jeb's winning scrub list was the creation of a private firm, ChoicePoint of Alpharetta, Georgia. Now, it seems, ChoicePoint is back in the voter list business in Mexico at the direction of the Bush government. Months ago, I got my hands on a copy of a memo from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, marked "secret", regarding a contract for "intelligence collection of foreign counterterrorism investigations". Given that the memo was dated September 17 2001, a week after the attack on the World Trade Centre, hunting for terrorists seemed like a heck of a good idea. But oddly, while all 19 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, the contract was for obtaining the voter files of Venezuela, Brazil ... and Mexico. What those Latin American countries have in common, besides a lack of terrorists, is either a leftleaning president or a left candidate for president ahead in the opinion polls, leaders of the floodtide of Bushhostile Latin leaders. It seems that the Bush government feared the leftist surge was up against the US's southern border. As we found in Florida in 2000, my investigations team on the ground in Mexico City this week found voters in poor neighbourhoods, the left's turf, complaining that their names were "disappeared" from the voter rolls. ChoicePoint can't know what use the Bush crew makes of its lists. But erased registrations require us to ask, before this vote is certified, was there a purge as there was in Florida? Notably, ruling party operatives carried registration lists normally in the hands of elections officials only. (In Venezuela in 2004, during the special election to recall President Hugo Chavez, I saw his opponents consulting laptops with voter lists. Were these the purloined FBI files? The Chavez government suspects so but, victorious, won't press the case.) There's more that the Mexico vote has in common with Florida besides the heat. The ruling party's handpicked electoral commission counted a mere 402,000 votes more for their candidate, Felipe Calderón, over challenger Andrés Manuel López Obrador. That's noteworthy in light of the surprise showing of candidate Señor Blanko (the 827,000 ballots supposedly left "blank"). We've seen Mr Blanko do well before in Florida in 2000 when Florida's secretary of state (who was also cochair of the Bush campaign) announced that 179,000 ballots showed no vote for the president. The machines couldn't read these ballots with "hanging chads" and other technical problems. Humans can read these ballots with ease, but the handcount was blocked by Bush's conflicted official. And so it is in Mexico. The Calderón "victory" is based on a gross addition of tabulation sheets. His party, the Pan, and its election officials are refusing López Obrador's call for a hand recount of each ballot which would be sure to fill in those blanks. Blank ballots are rarely random. In Florida in 2000, 88% of the supposedly blank ballots came from AfricanAmerican voting districts that is, they were cast by Democratic voters. In Mexico, the supposed empty or unreadable ballots come from the poorer districts where the challenger's Party of the Democratic Revolution (PDR) is strongest. There's an echo of the US noncount in the southoftheborder tally. It's called "negative dropoff". In a surprising number of districts in Mexico, the federal electoral commission logged lots of negative dropoff: more votes for lower offices than for president. Did López Obrador supporters, en masse, forget to punch in their choice? There are signs of Washington's meddling in its neighbour's election. The International Republican Institute, an arm of Bush's party apparatus funded by the US government, admits to providing tactical training for Pan. Did Pan also make use of the purloined citizen files? (US contractor ChoicePoint, its Mexican agents facing arrest for taking the data, denied wrongdoing and vowed to destroy its copies of the lists. But what of Mr Bush's copy?) Mexico's Bushbacked ruling party claims it has conducted Mexico's first truly honest election, though it refuses to recount the ballots or explain the purge of voters. Has the Pan and its ally in Washington served democracy in this election, or merely Florida con salsa? • Greg Palast is the author of Armed Madhouse: Who's Afraid of Osama Wolf? China Floats Bush Sinks, the Scheme to Steal '08 and other Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Class War gregpalast Comments copperpenny July 8, 2006 01:24 AM What are you guys, a bunch of conspiracy theorists? Give it a break. All you are are a bunch of socialists anyway. As far as Mexico goes, if they would clean up their corruptive nature then they could do real things with their country. Under the laws of states, felons don't have the right to vote and if that is the way it is in Mexico then so be it. In the US, a convicted felon has the opportunity to get, in most cases, a restoration of voting rights. If they don't do it that is their problem. And as long as we are on the subject of rights, many people abuse those rights by not voting. What to you suggest, making it a violation of law not to vote. As far as I know, the evidence you submit may be tainted also, as you are a left leaning organization and would side with other left leaning organizations or voters to further your own worldview agenda. CarefulReader July 8, 2006 02:11 AM If corruption were really in Mexico's nature, they could hardly clean it up without a massive eugenics project or a massive cull of the corrupt individuals. Luckily, that's just nonsense, so no such measures are necessary. Even more nonsensical is the claim that by not voting, people abuse their right to vote. Compare with the right to remain silent, the right to join a political party, the right to stand as a candidate in the election, the right to have children, etc. djdworld July 8, 2006 02:57 AM Both of you really need to open your eyes and pull the Fox network BS out of your ears. Liberal, conservative, moderate, Muslim, Christian, Hindi means nothing to these people. They want total control over everybody and everything or they will kill everyone and destroy everything. Everyone keeps throwing around "conspiracy theorists" and the like. Remember "conspiracy theorists" came about because there are conspiracies. You think you are happy with what they are doing because you some how benefit from the chaos they create, copperpenny. Just remember when there is nobody on the left; the right will start to eat their own... Be warned there is a war going on. The war is against America and every other people governed country. Problem is it is our leaders (self imposed) that wage it on us. mexconcern July 8, 2006 03:02 AM Corruption is in politics nature, far closer to your homes than you seem to belive. If there's evidence that voters have been erased from the lists they should have ask their party representative next to the ballot house, not to a brit columnist around the corner, that obviously has a narrow view on mexico's elections and it's procedures. The EU delegates attended and gave their endorsement and vote of confidence. None of them have lost ther way back via Miami and thought "mmh, smells like tacos"... so dissapointing that you've got a job at the guardian. They have overestimate your witts. Lazz July 8, 2006 03:39 AM Brit columnist???? Please correct me if I am in error, but I have always recognised Palast as born and bred in the U.S.A. with a commendable shitdisturbing journalistic career firmly rooted in Central and South American issues. The fact that he is rarely published in the land of his birth is testament, I believe, to the pertinence and validity of the questions he asks. durandal July 8, 2006 05:02 AM Guardian bought the voter list of Clark Country during the 2004 election and used it to try to influence the election. Hypocrites. WarrenSmith July 8, 2006 05:37 AM Palast forgot to mention another more obvious (also at present more solid) similarity between Florida 2000 and Mexico 2006: in both cases the wrong candidate won due to the presence of a thirdparty "spoiler." Bush won by 537 votes due to Nader as spoiler with over 97000 votes, most of which would have gone to Gore. Calderon won by 0.6% thanks to Mercado (who was "lefter" than Obrador) as spoiler; she got 2.7%, most of which would have gone to Obrador. It is common for the candidate X that voters prefer by a majority over Y, nevertheless to lose to Y, even if everything is 100% legitimate, due to the flawed properties of the "plurality voting" system. A better voting system in "range voting." See the CRV web site rangevoting for more info. If you want democracy where voters can actually get what they want by voting, then please endorse range voting by then clicking "endorse" and filling out the form. This "wrong winner" phenomenon has happened in about oneeighth of all US presidential elections, according to rangevoting/FunnyElections.html . It tends to cause a bias causing the worst man to win in close elections. I'd rather have a system in which the best wins. Joshuaindc July 8, 2006 07:58 AM Here's a simple question: If you were Felipe Calderon and you wanted to scrub people from the electoral rolls, would you want to use an accurate list of all registered voters that's kept uptodate by the federal election authorities, or would you want an old list from your buddy George W. Bush that's at least 6 million voters short? What Palast's not telling his readers is that the ChoicePoint story is over three years old. It made a sensation when it was reported in April of 2003. In November of that year, the AP explained that the firm "assembled a database containing the personal information of 65 million votingage Mexican citizens, information which the U.S. government purchased." But during the three and a half years since then, voters have moved, new voters have registered and others have died. During the 2006 election there were 71 million registered voters in Mexico (and the 65 million in ChoicePoint's database weren't even registered voters they were citizens of votingage). Palast wants to make the Bush connection stick so he writes , disingenuously, that "ruling party operatives carried registration lists normally in the hands of elections officials only" That's true, they're the sole property of the Federal Election Institute (IFE), but all of the parties have ACCESS to the info. El Universal reports: "Although the parties are allowed access to the voter rolls known in Mexico as the "padrón" they are forbidden to use them for campaign purposes." So, why use an old list from ChoicePoint? It makes no sense. Ulla July 8, 2006 08:22 AM Greg Palast launched his new book on Wednesday in Edinburgh. I believe his research is very thorough, as it took him four years to write his new book and the result of his investigative economic research is quite surprising. I wouldn't go so far to dismiss his findings, but it also takes a while to reflect on it and build up my own opinion, too and to have a public discussion about it. I am sure he is at least partly right, but to know to which extend I am waiting for other intelligent ethical trustworthy people to take the findings up and discuss them. I would quite like to know what Gary Younge and George Monbiot and John Pilger and Riobert Fisk would make out of it. I am not sure if I would trust any other columnist to be unbiased and have the same political background to give an objective evaluation. I am still unsure if I should get the book, as I am skint, but am very curious. Anyways his new book is more about the Iraq war and the oil industry and that's where he makes the link to Venezuela, Latin America and Mexico. KillerDiller July 8, 2006 08:27 AM 4 Points in Defense of Polast (and not eugenics): 1. To say Mexico has a corrupt nature, politics has a corrupt nature, etc, is to begin a deep decline into a condescending well of tripe. Scheming on the corruption of nature " any nature, political or otherwise " will not bring you closer to the light of a conclusion. The smartest answer is to find the corruption; seek it out, destroy it, and pat yourself on the back when you’re done. Don’t complain when you and your society are equally as guilty (and you know they probably are) as anyone else’s, act! 2. Granted, an American buying into the purity of the Florida election results is like a fat man bighting into a Big Mac; it’s only going to make things worse. The fact the Bushes even own a company geared towards voter inquisition is suspect, but the company’s presence in Mexico, even if it was back in 2003, is out of order. Given that the administration is solidly in favor of the Pan, their presence becomes more questionable. What if a Venezuelan company privately organized by Hugo Chavez’s top aid came to Florida in 2000 for a partisan inquest into registered voters? Do you think something would be wrong with that? 3. To say that Mercado's involvement in the election was as a hindrance to the democratic process is to fault democracy for being democratic. People should be allowed to vote for whomever they wish. The Bushes have proved that they can take your name off a voter list so that you won’t be able to vote even when your eligible; now Joshuaindc and others like him want to eliminate someone’s name from a ballot completely. Where's the decency in that? 4. Accepting a nonvote simply because of machine error is far too sketchy to have integrity under an election butressed by the United Nations. A proceeding as sensitive as a popular election, when the fate of a nation’s livelihood hangs in the balance of a hundred thousand chads, demands calm and meticulous attention. A recount of those Senor Blanko ballots is in order, a withdrawal from the recount of all political interests barring the United Nations is in order, and negative drop off must be noted and eliminated as much as possible in all coming elections throughout the world. Tyranny can get away with murder, but must our society bare the horrible consequences? Cynosarges July 8, 2006 08:32 AM What is "rotten", and "smells" is the hypocritical claims of today's left, exemplified by Mr Palast, that any vote that doesn't match their beliefs must have been fixed by some vast rightwing conspiracy. It is a pity that they never wrote such articles about the results in the Soviet Union, the DDR, the PRc, and other countries where fixed elections were the rule, and evidence could be found. PrincessPam July 8, 2006 08:47 AM copperpenny. There is nothing wrong with being a socialist (or a communist) in Europe. We don't have a McCarthy like figure telling us it is "unEuropean" to vote for leftleaning parties. The problem we have is that if we had a real Labour Government and not a new Social Democratic Party, the Americans would not have allowed it. They would have been interferring in our democratic elections as a leftleaning government may have stopped them spying on our European neighbours at Fylingdales and menworth Hill, or we may have stopped bombing runs from US bases (come on it's 60 years since the end of WWII and we've thanked you enough, now go home). Every country is entitled to democratic elections, free from interference by foreign powers who don't like the ideologies. Mxico won't be the first country in Central America to have its elections interfered with, and it won't be the last. If one method doesn't work, then the American terrorist training school, the School of the Americas, will ensure a lack of stability. If a country is going to be democratic, and it's really down to the will of the people (some people may not want democracy, absolute Monarchy may be an alternative in some places for example), then there should be a truly democratic system in place. Somebody shouldn't be allowed to buy the election because they have more money, and foreign interference in elections should not be allowed, nor foreign ownership of media organisations. Oh and before somebody tells me the UK system isn't democratic, I know and I want it changed so it is. It's not right that somebody with 36% of the vote can have more than 50% of the seats in parliament. It's not democratic and the government has no mandate. oidunno July 8, 2006 08:50 AM Cynosarges, If there is a conspiracy to undermine democracy do you think we should do anything about it, or just ignore it? The latter seems to be your position, but it is hardly that of a democrat. A democrat would insist on fair elections regardless of who 'won'. If you can refute the claims that Mr Palast makes then all well and good, but if you can't then you ought to support an investigation into any illegal US government or company influence on a Mexican election. Why can't you see these simple democratic principles? I suspect you've had your brain fucked over by right wing radio. oidunno July 8, 2006 08:59 AM copperpenny accuses Mr Palast (and all evil left wingers) of being a conspiracy theorist. In evidence he offers the following: 'As far as I know, the evidence you submit may be tainted also, as you are a left leaning organization and would side with other left leaning organizations or voters to further your own worldview agenda.' Now, who is the 'conspiracy theorist' again? bush2001 July 8, 2006 09:06 AM Look I live in Mexico and I don't think it's that hard to believe that Bushy himself and corruption (Old money)in Mexico really are the ones who won the election (in an effort to stabilize foreigh investers interest in the country). Almost 80% of the Mexico's people live in poverty! What's so hard to believe that those people would vote for someone that's offering them a way out of the misery they live in day by day. You have no idea on how things are Mexico! If you don't have 50.00 US Dollars your child can actually die of an infection on his finger, because the parents make less then that a week and they have to use there whole weeks salary to barely feed their children. How in the HELL can so many civilized nations accept such thivery and fraud from a people that have nothing to look forward in life. it's a sin to sit there and not pressure your government to pressure the winning party the PAN to accept the recount. I spend $80.00 US Dollars a week just in gas for my truck!!! I am ashamed when I think of these after I know and see millions of poor Mexicans suffer so much to care and feed their children on a shameful less then $50.00 a week. When people like Carlos Slim (Mexican Citezen telmex) the third riches man in the world pay's his people! Is that what you want, a shameful unforgiven sin on the Mexican people? They don't deserve that! The country is so rich in natural resources but people who pay for the political muscle are the ones who enjoy the benefits of all that oil, copper, silver and gold. How can anyone question the GOD given right to feed your most precious,your children! That is exactly what Lopez Obrador offered his people! The GOD given right to not see your child die of starvation! Just exactly how many Mexicans do you think voted for him? It's very simple, all the poor ones, which like said is almost 80% of the country! darkillusion July 8, 2006 09:22 AM yet again, the great land of the free and home to the brave has destroyed another democracy, an act it certainly has had plenty of practise carrying out since the 2WW. But then, what's another government denied power when they would have done lefty things like improve the life of the vast majority of the inhabitants rather than enrich further the bloated greedy few? And how feeble a crime this is when you are killing innocent people, thousands of them children, in the middle east without a twinge of remorse. lies are nothing when you can kill with impunity. Manche July 8, 2006 09:23 AM djdworld spot on. wearsider July 8, 2006 10:05 AM The US has interfered in countless elections since world war 2, ostensibly, to fight communism which meant any faintly prgressive or left wing government was at risk, not just in central and south america (re. their "right" to interfere enshrined in the Monroe doctrine) but also continental Europe. This was first demonstrated in Italy in the immediate post war elections when the communists were in with a real chance of victory. Perhaps in this election such interference was understandable, if not justified, given the fate of other east european countries who fell into the Soviet orbit. However, the US seems to think it has a God given right to interfere in other countries affairs and elections, which makes a mockery of its claims to be fighting for democracy and the will of the people. However, too many people in the American establishment (both democratic and republican) and the American people themselves believe in this noble myth. VictorMariategui July 8, 2006 10:18 AM Useful coverage of the likely fraud at counterpunch/ross07072006.html rebelion/noticia.php?id=34245 Titab July 8, 2006 10:30 AM What a bunch of crap! 1. Anyone with his/her name dissapeared from the voter rolls has the right to complain. For this election the PRD is collecting a list of complaints regarding this matter. So, if there was a relation about them, this should appear in the next days. 2. PRD hasn't really play the card of the dissapeared names, which indicates the problem is not as big as this article wants to make it look. 3. In every election post there are representatives of each party that verify the count. Thus blank votes should be really blank to be counted as such. Exactly the same happens for invalid votes. Each representative gets a copy of the count, giving his/her party the chance to produce their own count of votes. If there are any discrepancies the ballot box is opened in front of looooooots of people, and there is a recount of the votes. Therefore, Palast only shows an interest on finding strange things where there is none (le quiere buscar chichis a las culebras), in addition to an absolute ignorance of the election system in Mexico. We don't do electronic vote Mr Palast, we are not Florida. The Mexican democratic system cost so much blood and tears that it is irresponsible to call it a fraud or corrupt without having the right proofs. If we were so corupt, Mr Fox wouldn't have been the president. Today Lopez Obrador claims a fraud without even releasing his own information of the election. He lost and now he has a hard time accepting it. I am by no means supporter of Felipe Calderon, but accusing the IFE of fraud is accusing every single honest mexican that collaborated in this process of organised corruption. Giving the fact the country is virtually divided by the parties this situation is unfeasible. In any case, what is more discouraging is the idea that if Felipe Calderon had lost he would be making similar claims. stevemonty July 8, 2006 11:17 AM Greg Palast is on of the best journalists around, and this is an excellent piece of investigative journalism which builds on his other work. It clearly highlights new types of tactics used to manipulate power structures. chimpwatch July 8, 2006 11:45 AM Mexico's presidential election is suspect, to say the least, and involvement in the process by Bush administration criminals is even more reason to suspect fraud. On the bright side, "free trade" has been a catastrophe for Latin America, and widespread suspicion that Mexico's election has been hijacked by foreign reactionaries should undermine the Bushfriendly Calderon government, paving the way for an honest government dedicated to serving the interests of Mexico's citizens, instead of foreign capitalists. billstickers July 8, 2006 12:02 PM AMLO has called a rally in the main square (its a big square) of Mexico City, for this afternoon. Check news after midnight for reports of turnout etc. This may be just a preliminary meeting, but last time (when being threatened with disqualification from running) 2 million turned up (it's a very big square). Check this (notpro AMLO, but has updates) Mexican newspaper (Spanish) for some idea of what's happening. Or check back here and I'll tell you. billstickers July 8, 2006 12:18 PM Forgot the link.... eluniversal.mx/noticias.html hrhpod July 8, 2006 12:30 PM Why is it so inconceivable to some people, to think that governments may lie or cheat to keep hold of power? Especially when all the evidence, for as long as records have been kept, suggests otherwise? Anybody who has the desire to hold office, is almost always unsuitable to do so that's my rule of thumb. So to answer just a few of the nastier/stupider comments here... Greg Palast isn't a partisan hack like many US journalists he has said himself that he doesn't care which rich white boy wins the US Elections he just wants it to be the one who got the most votes. He's a democrat with a small 'd' ie he wants to see democracy enacted. He also isn't a Brit. As to complaining that people should talk to election officials I've no doubt they did but there's bugger all anybody can do by polling day if your name has disappeared from the list. Provisional ballots was the USA solution that worked out really well as they chucked about 3 million of them away uncounted in America. There goes President Kerry, consigned to history's dumpster. Furthermore, just because someone has leftwing political leanings, it doesn't mean that they're wrong about hard facts. Everything isn't a conspiracy theory in the other direction either. And when did we move to being able to dismiss something out of hand simply because we suggest that there is a conspiracy? Richard III conspired to kill his brother's children. Guy Fawkes 'conspired' to blow up parliament. Hitler 'conspired' to rig German elections. Bush and Blair 'conspired' to go to war in Iraq and 'conspired' to lie about their reasons. The Downing st memo PROVES that. Politicians DO conspire with each other. It's not all like an episode of the bloody 'west wing' you know. Mores the pity. Roosevelt was such an exception to the rule, you lot are still moaning over his work. As for making vicious, racist stereotypes about whole nations, well that's simply beyond contempt. Greg Palast is non partisan he simply believes in social justice and equality. If you have arguments with those concepts then that makes you selfish and elitist which unless you're actually have something to be elitist about is a pretty foolish position because if you think the ruling powers care one damn about you if you've got nothing to offer them, you're deranged. Conservativism is at roots, the attempt to justify selfishness, Socialism at its roots is simply common decency. And I was at the Edinburgh launch too Ulla buy the book skint or not, it's worth the money. Unlike most folk here, I've actually read it. If you want to see how new forms of Western military intervention can be even worse than the colonialism of old, look no further than Somalia. This east African state has, for more than 100 years, been a plaything of the Western powers. It was divided and ruled by the British, French and Italians during the colonial period from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1960s; it was dominated by America in the late 1970s and 1980s, when it became a proxy state in Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan’s Cold War against the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, in 1992, it became a stage for ‘humanitarian intervention’: thousands of US soldiers, including marines, landed on its beaches under the banner Operation Restore Hope, apparently to save Somalis from ‘warlordism’ and famine. And now it has become the latest outpost in the West’s ‘war on terror’. America has done an aboutface and funded and armed the warlords it fought against in 1992 and 1993, encouraging them to face down the militia of the Islamic Courts Union that recently took the capital Mogadishu. From colonialism to Cold War intrigue, from humanitarianism to counterterrorism, Somalia has been on the receiving end of every form of Western military intervention over the past century. Each era of intervention shared one thing in common: it screwed the people of Somalia, robbing them of the right to determine their own affairs and dividing them along lines that suited various Western powers. Yet, if anything, the new postCold War interventionism has proved even worse for Somalis than the colonialism and Cold War antics that went before it. Where the old forms of intervention, motivated by Western competition and interest, at least ensured a kind of stability in Somalia, the new forms of intervention, motivated by a combination of moral posturing and irrational fear, have left the country as a dangerous vacuum |